I analyze the relationship between health care institutions and the utilization of outpatient services by individuals aged 50 and above. I use cross-sectional micro data from thirteen European countries. I focus on the out-of-pocket costs of health care utilization, the gatekeeper role of general practitioners, and how these institutional settings are related to public and private care utilization. I …nd that copayments are related negatively to the probability of visiting a general practitioner among those in good health condition. I estimate the utilization of private specialist care to be higher in countries where copayments are required for public specialist care, and where the general practitioners have gatekeeper role. These estimated associations with private specialist care utilization are relatively large in magnitude, and are driven by individuals in the top income quartile.
Introduction
In this paper I provide quantitative results on how the utilization of outpatient care among people aged 50 and above in Europe is related to the out-of-pocket costs of health care services and to the gatekeeper role of general practitioners. As an empirical novelty, I also analyze the utilization of private care in relation to the health care institutions. If the use of health services increases with public …nancing then that might indicate over-utilization, i.e. utilization above the socially optimal level. However, decreasing out-of-pocket costs might improve the overall health level of the population through making preventive and curative health services available. The use of private care is also of policy interest: it can decrease the burden on the public budget and public health care facilities, but might violate the equal accessibility of health services.
The basic di¢ culty in the empirical analysis is that the prices of health services realized by the patients are not observed. In order to analyze the relation between out-of-pocket costs and utilization I use the indicators of cost-sharing arrangements as indirect measures of out-of-pocket costs. I base the empirical analysis on household-level data, which has the advantage that a wide range of individual characteristics can be controlled for which are likely to in ‡uence the demand for health services. The data used are from the An earlier version of this paper was written during my PhD studies at Central European University, Budapest, and consists a chapter of my PhD thesis.
second wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) . I analyze the utilization of two types of outpatient health services: health care provided by general practitioners and by specialists.
The main novelty of the paper is estimating how some selected characteristics of the public health care system are related to the utilization of private outpatient care. This analysis is possible since as a unique feature of SHARE, information on private care utilization is included in the data. Two basic mechanisms can in ‡uence the demand for private care. First, the disutility of private care utilization can be lower than that of public care, due to shorter waiting times or higher quality of services. Second, the costs of private care services are typically higher. On the other hand, the demand for public outpatient care is in ‡uenced among others by the out-of-pocket costs of services, the availability and quality of care.
The main results indicate the expected associations between the analyzed …nancing and organizational indicators, and public and private care utilization. There is also some evidence that cost-sharing implies higher utilization of public specialist care, which can be due to the higher quality of services or to reverse causality. The estimation results indicate that if someone does not have any chronic health problem in the analyzed 50+ population then the likelihood of visiting a public general practitioner (GP) is 13 percentage points lower if copayments are required, 11 percentage points lower if GPs have gatekeeper role. The estimated probability of visiting a private specialist is 4 percentage points higher if GPs act as gatekeepers, and 3 percentage points higher if there are copayments for specialist care. These results are driven by people in the top income quartile.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I summarize the main results of the related empirical literature. In section 3 I present the basic characteristics of the health care systems in the analyzed countries. The data used in the empirical analysis are described in section 4. The empirical speci…cation and the results of the regression models are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
There are few empirical results on the relationship between public health expenditures and health care demand in Europe. As for the U.S., the general …nding is that health insurance coverage and higher coinsurance rate increase the demand for health services, due to the reduced costs of utilization. Such result is found among others by [1] , based on the RAND Health Insurance Experiment.
One strand of the related literature uses aggregate data to analyze the determinants of health care utilization and aggregate health expenditures. As summarized by [2] , there is consensus in the literature that aggregate income is a crucial factor in explaining health expenditure di¤erences across the countries, and it has positive e¤ect. This relationship is found e.g. by [3] based on a sample of 20 OECD countries over years 1960 87, who at the same time do not …nd any signi…cant e¤ect of public …nancing on per capita health expenditures. In contrast, [4] estimate a signi…cantly negative e¤ect of public …nancing on health expenditures, but they also …nd a positive e¤ect of per capita GDP.
More information can be gained about the in ‡uencing factors of health care utilization if individual data are used. The horizontal equity in utilizing inpatient and outpatient care services in 11 developed countries is analyzed by [5] . Their main …nding is that there are only small inequities in the health care distribution.
[5] relate the cross-country di¤erences in equity to some country-speci…c health care characteristics as costsharing and gatekeeping arrangements. However, due to the complexity of the health care systems no clear patterns could be found. [6] use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to analyze the determinants of outpatient care utilization in Europe, with a focus on the e¤ects of income and education.
They report cross-country di¤erences, and …nd that richer and more educated individuals utilize specialist care generally to a higher extent. They relate these …ndings to some institutional characteristics: copayments required and the relative importance of the private sector can contribute to socioeconomic inequities.
In a recent paper [7] compare the importance of individual and institutional factors in outpatient care utilization in Europe using the SHARE data, and …nd greater role of individual factors. According to their results, institutional factors like physician density, copayment and gatekeeping have a greater role in determining visits to specialists than to general practitioners. [8] also provide an international analysis of the determinants of outpatient care utilization based on the ECHP data. They estimate the organizational variables to have basically the expected e¤ects, but they also …nd that fee-for-service payment schemes increase the frequency of visits to specialists. The authors conclude that this …nding can indicate demand induced by the physicians.
My research di¤ers from these papers not only in the applied sample and empirical methods, but also in the research question. The out-of-pocket (OOP) costs of outpatient services cannot be described with a single measure. One indicator is the ratio of private household out-of-pocket expenditures within the total health expenditures.
However, this indicator refers to all types of health expenditures, including the costs of hospital care and 1 The source of the WHO data is the European health for all database. The WHO de…nition of physician is a person who has completed studies in medicine at the university level. It excludes among others physicians not practising, and dentists. The number of specialist includes the number of physicians specialized in dermatology, gynecology, ophthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, paediatrics, radiology, and urology. medicines. Therefore additional information would be needed to estimate the e¤ect of OOP costs of outpatient services on utilization.
The generosity of the mandatory health insurance can also in ‡uence outpatient care utilization. More generous public health system can imply not only lower OOP payments, but also less need for voluntary health insurance. Higher public health expenditures relative to the GDP and to the population can indicate better availability and higher quality of health services, which can induce demand for medical care.
Table 1 here
The utilization of health services can also be in ‡uenced by the copayment requirements. In some of the countries the patients have to pay for outpatient visits. Two main rationales for cost-sharing arrangements are to reduce the burden on the public budget, and to avoid the problem of over-utilization. I summarize below the cost-sharing policies for GP and specialist care in the analyzed countries. The summary is based on [6] and [11] . The additional sources of information are indicated by country.
Apart from the health care resources, expenditures, and copayments for outpatient services, the legal status of medical doctors also di¤er across the countries. Belgium The rate of copayments is 25% (10%) for GPs, and 40% (15%) for specialists. The values in brackets apply for patients in socioeconomically vulnerable groups, among others pensioners and disabled with income below a speci…ed limit. GPs mainly work in private practices, whereas specialists can either work in a private practice or at an outpatient department of a hospital. GPs have no gatekeeper function, the patients can directly access the specialists.
([13])
Czech Republic User fees for doctoral visits were introduced only in 2008, before that the inpatient and outpatient health services were free of charge. About 95% of the primary health services were privatized in 2002. The vast majority of outpatient specialists have also become private in the past few years. There is no gatekeeping function of GPs, but referral from a GP to specialists is still recommended, and indeed common practice. ( [14] , [15] ) Denmark There are no copayments for GP care and for most of the specialist services for Group 1 citizens (including 99% of the population), but specialist care is free only after a referral from a GP. Therefore GPs act as gatekeepers for Group 1 citizens. People choose between coverage options "Group 1" -the default, and "Group 2" -which provides free choice of physicians without referral from GP, but the costs are covered only up to the corresponding costs of patients in Group 1. GPs and specialists are private, self-employed
France The rate of copayments is 30%: people pay 100% up-front, but health insurance funds reimburse 70% of doctoral visit costs. In general there are no upper limit on the services reimbursed. Patients with speci…ed long-term illnesses are exempt from the copayments. Greece There are no copayments for outpatient GP and specialist care, but informal payments are prevalent. Due to structural problems, the utilization of private care is widespread, which requires out-of-pocket payments. Outpatient services are provided by public or private practitioners. GPs have no gatekeeper or referral role in Greece. ( [19] )
Italy There are no copayments for GP consultations, but there is some evidence for informal payments. The fee of specialist care varies by regions, the maximum amount is 36 EUR per visit. People with chronic diseases, with disabilities, aged above 65 with income below a minimum are exempt from the copayments.
GPs contract with the government and act as gatekeepers, however some specialist services (e.g. gynecology and optometric services) can be accessed directly. Because of the low quality and long waiting times in the public sector, there is high demand for private specialist care. ( [20] )
Netherlands There are no cost-sharing arrangements for GP and outpatient specialist care. GPs are registered at the government and have private practices. Outpatient specialist services are mainly provided by the outpatient facilities of the hospitals. The specialists are self-employed and contract with the hospitals.
GPs act as gatekeepers, and the majority of medical problems are treated by them, which indicates that the gatekeeping system is e¢ cient.
([21])
Poland There are no copayments for consultations with GPs and specialists in the public sector. There is evidence that informal payments to physicians are prevalent, but the share of primary health care in the informal payments is very small. GPs have an increasing role in the Polish health system. With some exceptions, specialist services are available only with a referral from the GP. Outpatient specialist care is provided either by private practitioners or by independent health care institutions.
([22])
Spain No cost-sharing arrangements apply for GP and outpatient specialist care in the public sector. Informal payments are practically not present in the Spanish health care. Primary care provision is basically publicly owned and sta¤ed. GPs act as gatekeepers, and may refer patients to specialized services if necessary.
For some service types referral is not needed. There is a mixture of private and public ownership in inpatient and outpatient specialist care provision.
([23])
Sweden Fees apply for consultations with GPs (ca. 15 EUR) and specialists (ca. 30 EUR), with a maximum of around 100 EUR per year. The fees vary by counties, but the maximum amount is set centrally. Switzerland 10% cost-sharing applies for GP and outpatient specialist services, but there is an upper limit on the copayments. In addition, people have to pay a part of the costs in the form of a deductible. This is set annually up to around 1,100 EUR, varying by insurance companies. Most of the outpatient health services are provided by independent practitioners. Patients have free choice of doctors, and have direct access to ambulatory specialist care. ( [25] )
Due to the international di¤erences in the cost-sharing policies (…xed fees, proportional fees, and the mixture of these), it is not possible in the empirical analysis to control directly for the magnitude of copayments required for outpatient services. On the other hand, it is possible to di¤erentiate the countries according to copayments are required or not. The categorization is still not trivial, since the cost-sharing regulations might vary across the population groups. I set the cost-sharing binary indicator to one in countries where o¢ cial cost-sharing applies to the majority of the population. According to this di¤erentiation, cost-sharing applies to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland in case of GP care. The list is extended with Italy in case of specialist care. The countries can also be di¤erentiated on the basis if GPs have a gatekeeper role, that is if a consultation with a GP is required for contacting a specialist. GPs are gatekeepers in Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Based on the summary provided above, outpatient services are provided to a large extent by private practitioners in the analyzed countries. Therefore the question of interest in the empirical analysis is not the demand for private care per se, but for such services which are out of the public health care system.
Data
The empirical analysis is based on the second wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), release 2.3.1. 2 The SHARE is a panel data set, it covers individuals aged 50 or above,
and their spouses.
I analyze the utilization of health care services based on the second wave of SHARE because it has wider country coverage than the …rst wave. Identi…cation by exogenous time-variation in health care systems is not possible because there are generally only small changes in the health institutions between waves one and two. The second wave of SHARE covers 14 countries, but since the imputations are not available for Ireland, I include 13 countries in my analysis: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The total size of the sample used is 30:8 thousand.
Applying individual data makes it possible to control for a wide range of individual and household speci…c characteristics which can in ‡uence health care utilization. The SHARE contains multiple imputations for income and wealth measures, and I use the average of these. I report some descriptive statistics of the variables in Table 2 . The income and wealth measures are generated by dividing the household level measures 2 This paper uses data from SHARE release 2. with the household size, and the values are purchasing power parity adjusted. As health indicators I use the number of reported chronic diseases the respondents ever had, ADL limitations, and reported symptoms.
3 Table 2 here
The outcome variables refer to outpatient care utilization in the last 12 months before the interview.
These are the reported visits to GPs and specialists. In addition, I analyze the utilization of services provided by private providers. Private care utilization is de…ned the following way in the generic SHARE questionnaire: receiving any of the speci…ed types of care from private providers that the respondent paid himself or through a private insurance because he would have waited too long, or could not get them as much as needed, in the National Health System. Thus, if for example GPs are private practitioners in a country, but visits to GPs are covered by the social security system then utilization of GP care is not de…ned as private care utilization.
The utilization measures cannot perfectly capture the demand for care, as there might be individuals who demand a service but cannot access it. The SHARE wave 1 data provide some information on forgone care, and only 0:4% of the respondents report forgoing GP care due to unavailability. For specialist care this ratio is 0:9%. Table 3 here
The percentage of respondents reporting outpatient care utilization in each country is presented in the …rst part of Table 3 . Some of the cross-country di¤erences can be due to di¤erences in the characteristics of the respondents, therefore in the second part of the table I present the predicted utilization for a representative individual. I return to these predictions in section 5.3.
The binary indicator of public care utilization equals one if the respondent reports some health care utilization, but no private care utilization. The utilization of specialist care varies more across the countries than the utilization of GP services.
The binary indicator of private care utilization equals one if the respondent reports private care utilization.
Due to data limitations it cannot be identi…ed if a respondent utilizes private care only or both private and public care. Private care utilization is less prevalent for GP care than for specialist care. The highest ratio of patients report private specialist care utilization in the Mediterranean countries, Poland, and Switzerland. In these countries specialist health services are available only to a limited extent within the framework of the public health system. These SHARE statistics are in line with the WHO statistics presented in Table   1 , in the sense that the private care utilization statistics are positively correlated with the relative amount of private health care expenditures. In Table 2 I also present the descriptive statistics for the subsample of those individuals who report the utilization of private GP or specialist care. The only strong di¤erence is that those who utilize private care report on average worse health status. 3 The chronic health conditions included in the survey are: heart attack, high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol, stroke, diabetes, chronic lung disease, asthma, arthritis, osteoporosis, cancer, stomach ulcer, Parkinson disease, cataracts, hip or fremoral fracture, Alzheimer's disease, and benign tumor.
The ADL limitations include di¢ culties with dressing, walking across a room, eating, bathing, getting in or out of bed, and using the toilet.
The speci…ed symptoms are: pain in a joint, heart trouble, breathlessness, persistent cough, swollen legs, sleeping problems, falling down, fear of falling down, dizziness, stomach problems, incontinence, and fatigue.
Regression analysis

Benchmark models
I apply regression estimations so as to quantify the relationship between outpatient care utilization and the indicators of health care institutions. Following the seminal paper of [26] , I assume that health care utilization is based on the utility maximizing behavior of the individuals. This assumption makes it reasonable to include a rich set of regressors in the empirical model that can indicate individual speci…c health and "health production" characteristics. In the preferred estimations I control for a set of institutional characteristics at the same time. I di¤erentiate the utilization of public and private care.
Due to potential reverse causality from health care demand to health care institutions, my estimation results cannot be interpreted as causal e¤ects of institutions on utilization. Still, the following analysis can reveal some underlying mechanisms how the institutional settings in ‡uence the health care utilization. Easier access, higher quality and lower out-of-pocket costs of public health services can increase the demand for and utilization of public care. As for private health services, the disutility attached to health services can be lower due to the shorter waiting times or higher quality of services. Private care can be a suitable option also if the access to public (specialist) care is restricted by gatekeeping. On the other hand, private care is typically more costly for the patients than public care.
I estimate linear probability models of public and private care utilization. Since the regressors are the same in the models of the two types of utilization, the seemingly unrelated regression estimates of public and private care utilization are equivalent to the equation-by-equation OLS estimates. 4 The estimated standard errors of the coe¢ cients allow for clustering on the country level. Clustering is needed since I use country level aggregate explanatory variables (following [27] ), and also there might be some unobservables which are country speci…c, thus correlated within countries. Using clustered standard errors has considerable e¤ect on the statistical signi…cance of the country speci…c coe¢ cients.
The linear probability models have the following form:
where Y 1 refers to public care utilization, and Y 2 to private care utilization, and index i is the individual index.
The X vector of regressors includes the following variables apart from a constant term: variables indicating the individual budget constraint (logarithm of income, housing wealth, and …nancial wealth), indicators of individual preferences and health behaviors (age, gender, marital status, education level, current employment status, being self employed ever, living area, and smoking dummies), and health indicators (number of reported chronic health problems, ADL di¢ culties, symptoms). The Z vector includes the following country speci…c regressors: the number of providers in the given service type, binary indicators of copayments required for GP and specialist care, and a binary indicator of the gatekeeper role of GPs. I do not include a measure of public health expenditures in these models since such a regressor would clearly be subject to reverse causality. The more public health care the people utilize, the higher the public expenditures are.
I present in Table 4 the estimated coe¢ cients of the country speci…c regressors. 5 The copayment and gatekeeper indicators are binary variables, hence the coe¢ cients can be interpreted as the di¤erence in the probability of utilization with and without copayment arrangements or gatekeeper function of GPs. For the sake of comparison, in the …rst part of Table 4 I also report the estimated coe¢ cients of interest if only one of the country speci…c regressors is included at a time, apart from the individual speci…c controls. Table 4 here
The estimated coe¢ cients of copayments, gatekeeper role, and the number of providers are qualitatively robust to the inclusion of the country speci…c regressors one by one or jointly. The only exception here is the coe¢ cient of the indicator of GP copayments, which has reverse sign under the two speci…cation. In addition, the estimated association between public specialist care utilization, and copayments and gatekeeper role are The estimation results indicate a non negligible but statistically insigni…cant negative association between copayments and the probability of public GP care utilization. In countries where copayments are required the probability of public GP care utilization is around 6 percentage points lower, holding the other factors …xed. At the same time the probability of private GP care utilization is about 1 percentage point higher. As for specialist care, the estimation results indicate that the probability both of public and private specialist care utilization is considerably higher if there are copayments. The relatively strong positive relationship with public specialist care utilization can be explained either by supply side e¤ects (demand generated by the health care providers), or by the higher quality of care if there are copayments.
If GPs have gatekeeper role in a country then the utilization of public outpatient specialist care is less likely by more than 8 percentage points, whereas that of private specialist care is more likely by 4 percentage points. The results indicate that the probability of GP care utilization is not in an economically or statistically signi…cant relation with the gatekeeper role of GPs. The results also show that the higher relative number of health care providers is associated with higher probability of public care utilization. The higher number of providers can indicate better availability of services, and at the same time can be the consequence of higher demand for health care services. The signi…cant coe¢ cient in case of GP care can capture the cross country di¤erences in the role GPs have in the health care systems.
The estimation results can be compared to the related …ndings in the literature. [8] …nd based on the ECHP data that the number of physicians increases the visits to GPs but not to specialists -according to my estimates this e¤ect is positive or zero for both service types. They also estimate that the gatekeeper role of GPs increases the utilization of GP services but decreases that of specialist services. However, my results indicate negative e¤ect on both care types, although very weak and insigni…cant on GP care. [8] also analyze how the payment of doctors a¤ects health care utilization, and …nd that fee-for-service payments increase specialist care utilization. This is in line with my result on the positive association between specialist care utilization and copayments. Based on the ECHP data, [6] also …nd that the gatekeeper role of GPs decreases the utilization of specialist care, but increases the visits to GPs. 5 The estimated coe¢ cients of the individual speci…c regressors are available from the author upon request. [7] estimate models of physician utilization based on the …rst wave of SHARE data. The sign of the e¤ect of gatekeeping on GP visits, and of copayments on specialist visits estimated by [7] are di¤erent from my estimates. There are several potential reasons for these di¤erences: my estimates are based on a wider range of countries, I do not analyze the number of visits, the additional control variables di¤er, and also the gatekeeper and copayment arrangements are de…ned di¤erently -I generated these indicators based on the "Health systems in transition" series of the WHO. On the other hand, it is a similar result that specialist care utilization is more responsive to the institutional factors, especially to the copayment and gatekeeping indicators, than the visits to GPs.
According to my knowledge, there are no directly comparable empirical studies which analyze and internationally compare the utilization of private health care services. [10] analyzes the demand for private care in the U.K., and …nds that better socioeconomic status is generally associated with higher demand for private care services. Based on my estimations, a clear result is that higher number of reported chronic health conditions and symptoms increases the use of private health care.
Heterogeneity analysis
To get further insights into how the outpatient care utilization di¤ers along the institutional characteristics, I reestimate the linear models of utilization, allowing for heterogeneity with income and health status. This analysis can reveal whether those in worse …nancial status or worse health condition are more sensitive to the health care …nancing and gatekeeping arrangements. I interact the indicators of copayments and gatekeeping …rst with the binary indicators of receiving high or low income, then with reporting at least one chronic health condition. The binary indicators of high and low income equal one if the reported amount of income is above the country speci…c third quartile or below the …rst quartile, respectively. The third quartile has the highest value in Switzerland and the lowest in Poland, whereas the …rst quartile is the highest in Sweden, but again the lowest in Poland. As for the indicator of chronic health conditions, around 25% of the respondents report at least one chronic illness. The estimated coe¢ cients of interest are presented in Table 5.   6   Table 5 here There is some evidence for heterogeneous relation between the analyzed indicators of the health care systems and the utilization of outpatient care. As for GP care utilization, the only signi…cant result for heterogeneity across income groups is that those with low income are less likely to visit a GP if GPs have gatekeeper role. Copayments and the gatekeeping role of GPs are associated with lower likelihood of GP visits only if someone is in a good health condition. These negative associations are not present any more for those who report chronic health problems. Copayments can reduce the over-utilization of GP care, but might also decrease the utilization of preventive services among the healthy ones. The heterogeneity with respect to health can be partly due to the fact that in many countries those with chronic health condition are exempt from the copayments (see section 3 for some details).
The surprising positive association between public specialist care utilization and copayments is driven by those who have relatively high income and who report chronic health problems. The interaction term of copayments with low income is on the other hand negative. Again, the result that those with chronic health conditions are more likely to visit a specialist if there are copayments can be caused by exemptions from the 6 The estimated coe¢ cients of the individual speci…c regressors are available from the author upon request.
copayments, but no evidence is found that similar exemptions would drive up the utilization among the low income individuals. The results also indicate that the better-o¤ individuals are also more likely to utilize private specialist care if GPs have gatekeeper role, whereas those with low income are less likely to do so.
Thus the gatekeeper role of GPs seems to direct some of the better-o¤ individuals towards private specialist care, which might reduce the burden on the public health care system. A potential explanation can be that people with higher income are more likely to have voluntary private health insurance and that is why they use more private care. The second wave SHARE data do not provide information on the private health insurance coverage. Based on the …rst wave data [28] provides evidence that the probability of voluntary private health insurance coverage indeed increases with income, and the voluntary insurance increases the overall utilization of specialist care, although this e¤ect is insigni…cant.
In sum, the estimation results indicate that in the analyzed population if someone does not have any chronic health condition then the copayments required for GP services decrease the likelihood of visiting a public GP by 13 percentage points, and the gatekeeping role decreases it by 11 percentage points. The estimated probability of visiting a private specialist is on average 4 percentage points higher if GPs act as gatekeepers, and 3 percentage points higher if there are copayments for specialist care. These e¤ects are driven by people in the top income quartile. Although these estimated associations are small in absolute level, but comparing to the sample average of 3% utilizing private specialist care the relative magnitudes are large.
Country speci…c analysis
In order to unveil which countries drive the above presented estimation results, I reestimate the utilization models with including country dummies and omitting the country speci…c regressors. I then predict the probabilities of outpatient care use for a representative individual who has the median value of the continuous regressors and the mode of the categorical regressors. These results are presented in the second part of Table   3 .
The predicted utilization probabilities are close to the observed utilization rates, showing that the observed cross country di¤erences are mainly due to di¤erent institutional settings and not to di¤erences in the characteristics of the respondents among the countries.
There are some clear relationships between the country speci…c predicted probabilities of use and the institutional characteristics, in line with the regression results of section 5.1. The binary indicator of copayments for specialist care is associated with higher predicted probability of public specialist care use (correlation: 0.49). The gatekeeper role of GPs implies lower probability of public specialist care use (correlation: -0.44) but higher probability of private specialist care use (correlation: 0.23). Finally, higher public health expenditures are associated with higher likelihood of public care utilization. This association is negative with respect to private outpatient care utilization. The correlation of expenditures per GDP with the predicted utilization probability is similar for public GP care (0.49) and public specialist care (0.45). These positive associations cannot reveal causal relations as higher demand for public care might cause the higher expenditures. The country speci…c predicted probability of utilizing private care is on the other hand negatively related to the relative magnitude of public health expenditures. This can be the consequence of more generous public health care inducing the utilization of public care rather than private care, but the utilization of private care also decreases the magnitude of public health expenditures. The negative correlation is smaller for private GP care (-0.28) than for private specialist care (-0.49).
Conclusions
There are considerable di¤erences in public and private outpatient health care utilization among the Euro- Based on the estimation results, the probability of visiting a GP is lower if copayments are required, but only among those who do not report any chronic health conditions. Surprisingly, visiting both public and private specialist is more likely if there are copayments for the public visits, but these positive associations are present only for the better-o¤ individuals. The utilization of public outpatient care is lower if GPs have gatekeeper role, and at the same time the utilization of private specialist care is higher among those who have relatively high income.
These results indicate that if the aim is to avoid over-utilization of outpatient public health care then decreasing the generosity of public …nancing might be e¤ective in demand reduction. However, such policy changes can also decrease the utilization of important preventive services, which can eventually lead to worsening health condition. The empirical results also suggest that if the out-of-pocket costs of public health care are increased or if general practitioners have gatekeeper role then individuals partly substitute the public health services with private ones.
I conclude with some cautionary notes. The …ndings of the paper are based on a sample of individuals aged 50 and above, from thirteen countries, all of which are developed European countries. Therefore the estimates might not be valid for the whole population or for countries with much di¤erent health care systems.
Moreover, only a limited number of institutional characteristics can be controlled for because of the limited number of countries in the sample. Reverse causality is also an important concern, as the institutional settings might be altered based on the demand for health care services. Thus endogeneity concerns remain in the regression analysis and I cannot claim causality. Finally, the identi…cation is based on cross-country variation and not on the analysis of health care reforms, hence the policy implications of the results have to be treated carefully. Table 5 : Estimated coe¢ cients in the extended OLS models of utilization (coe¢ cients of individual speci…c characteristics not reported)
